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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEANNA POXLEY,

J
\\
j

Case No. 890493A

vs.

\\

Response to Appellant's
Motion for Rehearing

WILLIAM N. FOXLEY,

:
\

Plaintiff and
Appellee,

Defendant and
Appellant.

\
j

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and Appellee, Deanna Foxley,
pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and
at the request of this Court, and responds to the Petition for
Rehearing filed by the Defendant and Appellant, Dr. William N.
Foxley.
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I.
THE APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT "OVER-LOOKED"
HIS ARGUMENT REGARDING THE INCREASE OF CHILD SUPPORT
IS WITHOUT MERIT.
Appellant alleged in his peitition that this Court
"over-looked his argument on the increase in child support."
(Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, "APR", page 2.)

In support

of his position the Appellant submitted the following arguments.
First, the Appellant alleged "Not only must the court
find a substantial change of circumstances to justify an increase
in child support, but the District Court must also have something
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in the record to determine an amount." (APR, page 2.)

and,

second, the Appellant argued that Appellee "submitted no evidence
at trial in support of an increase of child support."
It should be noted that these same arguments were made
by the Appellant in his brief on appeal (see Appellant's initial
brief, pages 33-34 and his response to Appellee's brief, pages
11-16), and that the Appellant has not cited any authority in
support of his arguments.
Notwithstanding the above, contrary to the allegations
of the Appellant, the Court did find that there had been a
substantial change of circumstances (see Amended Finding of
Facts, Nos. 20 and 21). Furthermore, the record of this case
supports the Trial Court's finding of a change of circumstances
and the award of an increase of alimony.

Appellant apparently

chooses to ignore and/or disregard the findings of the the Trial
Court and the evidence and testimony at trial.
With regard to the substantial change of cirsumstances,
it is clear that the Trial Court was meticulous and deliberate in
its review of the evidence and its findings on this issue.

It

was undisputed that at the time of the divorce the Appellant's
income was $50.00 per month (see Amended Findings of Fact, No. 3,
which finding was based upon the financial declaration filed by
the Appellant at the time of the divorce).

At the time of the

modification hearing the Trial Court found that the Appellant had
an income in excess of $6,985.00 per month and that the Appellee
had an income of $800.00 per month (see Amended Finding of Fact
No. 22).
-2-

The evidence which supported the Trial Court's findings
concerning the Appellant's income included, but was not limited
to the Appellant's 1984-1987 Federal Tax Return, admitted as
Trial Exhibits Nos. 4-7 and the Appellants own testimony which
revealed that the Appellant earned in the first 6 months of private
practice of medicine over $90,000.00,

(TR2 106:3-12)

The

Appellant also testified that he was able to to invest $41,660.00
into a Keogh Retirement Plan in 1987.

(TR2 106:9-15)

There was more than sufficient evidence for the Trial
Court to conclude that there had been a sufficient change of
circumstances to justify an increase in the amount of child
support to be paid by the Appellant.
This Court, in its written opinion, agreed with the
Trial Court and held, "Clearly, the change in Mr. Foxley's income
from the negligible earnings of an unemployed student to his
earnings in recent years in excess of $100,000.00 per year is a
substantial change of circumstances justifying a modification of
the 1983 decree."

This Court concluded, "In light of these

findings (of the Trial Court), the increases in alimony and child
support are far from abuses of the trail court's discretion."
The next the Appellant maintains that the "District
Court must also have something in the record to determine an
amount".
Clearly, the testimony and evidence presented to the
Trial Court was sufficient for the Court to determine the
respective incomes of the parties and then to also determine an
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award of child support pursuant to the child support guildlines
then in effect.

With regard to the Trial Courtfs findings on

this issue see Amended Findings of Fact Nos. 13, 15, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24.
The Appellant, however, speculates "the court in
Finding No. 21, based its award of child support solely on the
Child Support Worksheet submitted after appellee's case was
closed and with no basis or foundation.

(APR, page 2.)

Amended Finding of Fact No. 21, states:

"Based upon

the change of circumstances and the needs of the children, child
support to be paid by the Defendant should be increased to the
appropriate amount reflected in the judicial district's support
guidelines."
The Trial Court did not refer to or reference in this
or any other Finding a child support worksheet prepared or
submitted by the Appellee.

The Appellant's arguement that the

Trial Court's award of an increase of child support was based
solely on a worksheet submitted after Appellee rested her case is
based on unfounded speculation, is without merit in the record
and should be disregarded by this Court.
Again, for argument only, it is important to note, as
referenced above, that the Trial Court found that the Appellee
had a gross monthly income of $800.00 per month and that the
Appellant had a gross monthly income in excess of $6,985.00 per
month (Amended Finding of Facts, No. 22), that the proprortionate
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share of the parties combined income was 10% and 90% for the
Appellee and Appellant, respectively (Amended Finding of Facts,
No. 23) and that based upon the parties combined adjusted gross
income, the Appellant should pay as child support $546.00 per
month per child (Amended Finding of Facts, No. 24.)
The Trial Court made a Finding that an increase of
child support was warranted based upon the evidence and testimony
concerning the material change of circumstances which had occured
since the decree was entered.

The Trial Court then determined

the amount of increase of child support pursuant to the child
support guildlines.

The Trial Court clearly complied with the

provisions of the laws of this State regarding the determination
of child support and, as such, the Appellants argument for
rehearing of this issue is without merit.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED THE NECESSARY FACTORS
IN AWARDING AN INCREASE IN THE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY.
The issues and elements involved in awarding alimony
were addressed by both parties in this appeal.

(See Appellant's

Brief, pages 9-29, and Appellantfs Reply Brief, pages 8-11.)
Appellee submits that the Appellant is attempting to take another
"shot" at an issue which has already been properly decided by
both this Court and the Trial Court.
The Appellant proposes the questions, "Can a requesting
spouse come into court and say that she has this need or that
need and not place into evidence a dollar amount that is
necessary to satisfy the needs requested or to raise her standard
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of living to a cerain level?

Does a requesting party have to

support the need with an express or implied dollar amount
attached to that need or standard of living?"

(APR, page 3.)

The Appellant, however, failes to offer any authority
to substantiate his allegation that a party must support a
petition for alimony with mathmatical certainty or with an
"express" dollar amount.
It cannot be disputed that it is the purpose of the
Trial Court to determine the amount of alimony based upon the
criteria as set forth by the Supreme Court and based upon the
evidence and testimony presented at trial.

Gill v. Gill, 718,

P2d 779 (Utah 1986), Savage v. Savage, 658 P2d 85 (Utah 1983),
Bushell v. Bushell, 649, P2d 85 (Utah 1982), Smith v. Smith, 751
P2d 1149 (Utah App. 1988).
In this case, the Appellee petitioned the Trial Court
for an increase in alimony.

The Trial Court, after the

presentation of the evidence and testimony, held that the
Appellee had "a real and substantial need for an increase in
alimony" and that it was "just and equitable that the monthly
alimony to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff should be
increased"

(See Amended Findings of Fact, Nos. 27 and 28.)
The Appellant argues, however, that, "the Appellate

Court over-looked the material factors enumerated by the Supreme
Court which seems to require evidence of a dollar amount in
setting an amount for alimony."

Again the Appellant makes his

argument on this issue without any reference to authority.
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The Appellant refers this Court to the elements
enumerated in the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P2d 1072 (Utah
1985).

Each of the elements referenced in Jones were addressed

by the Trial Court in this case.

The elements listed in Jones

concerning alimony and the evidence and findings of the Trial
Court are addressed below.
i.

Needs of the Appellee.

Evidence of the financial

condition and needs of the Appellee were presented at the
trial.

The Appellee testified that she had received a notice

from the County Assessor's Office that her house was to be sold
for back property taxes (TR2 77:6-10 and TRl 34:15-16); that
she had doctor and dental bills outstanding which were incurred
by the children (TR2 78-79); that she had student loan
obligations (TR2 79:8-10); that her home was need of
substantial repairs (TR2 80-81 and TRl 32-2-34); that she
required a new washing machine, dryer, stove, bed, and
furniture (TR2 8:3-22 and TRl 33-34); that she was 4-5 payments
delinquent on her mortgage payments (TRl 34:10-14); that she
and the children had during some periods of time had gone
without milk and bread (TRl 37:8-11); that the minor children
had a need for new clothing and shoes (TRl 38:1-12); and, that
the children had not been able to participate in some
extracirricular activities at school (TRl 41-42).
The Trial Court made specific findings concerning the
needs of the Appellee in Amended Findings of Fact, Nos. 10, 26
-7-

and 27.

In Amended Finding of Facts, No. 27 the Trial Court

specifically found, "at the time of the modification hearing,
there has been a substantial change in circumstances of the
parties, that the Plaintiff has a real and substantial need for
an increase in alimony that she has endured substantial and
significant personal hardships since the time of divorce."
Clearly, the requirment of a need for alimony was addressed by
the Trial Court.
ii.
herself.

Ability of the Appellee to provide income for

The Trial Court considered the ability of the

respondent to provide income for herself.

The Appellee testified

that she earned approximately $12,000.00 gross in the years of
1986 and 1987, working two part-time jobs.

(TR1 63:8-13) At the

time of the modification hearing the she had lost one of her
part-time employments and was only earning approximately $600.00
per month, she was also full time student and raising a family of
4 minor children (TRl 63-64).
The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff had a
substantial need for an increase in alimony.

(See Amended

Finding, No. 27.)
Clearly, the Trial Court considered the Appellee1s
ability to provide a sufficient income for herself, and the
Court's finding is supported by the evidence and testimony at
trial, as referenced above.
iii.

Appellant's ability to pay alimony.

The

Appellant's income had increased dramatically since the time of
-8-

the divorce as show by the evidence admitted at trial. (See Trial
Exhibits 3-7.)

Furthermore, the Appellant testified he earned

$112f000.00 in his private practice of medicine during 1987 and
also earned wages wages in excess of $16,000.00 during that year.
(TR2 106-107)
The Trial Court properly concluded from the testimony
and evidence that "The Defendant's present income is not
completely clear but the Court finds based upon the evidence that
his gross income can be interpreted as being as high as
$224,000.00 a year but certainly under no circumstances less than
approximately $120,000.00 per year.

(Findings of Fact, No. 17.)

Again, it cannot be disputed that the Trial Court considered the
Appellant's ability to pay alimony.
Finally, this Court, in its written opinion, held "If
the trial court's findings and conclusions show that the court
considered the material factors, we accord considerable
discretion to the trial court in determing the amounts of alimony
and child support."

Without question the Trial Court considered

the relevant and material factors of Jones in concluding that
alimony should be increase.

Accordingly, the Trial Court's

findings and this Court's decision on this matter are not properly
the subject for review on a petition for rehearing of this issue.
III.
THIS COURT PROPERLY RULED ON THE
ISSUE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The record and the Amended Findings of Fact of this
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case are replete with evidence, testimony and references to
support the Appellee's need for assistance with the attorney's
fees she incurred in bringing this matter to a hearing.

(See

Amended Finding of Facts, Nos. 10f 13, 22 and 26.) In addition,
the Trial Court found, in Finding No. 30, "attorney's fees should
be awarded to the Plaintiff in this case and that a reasonable
attorney's fees would the sum of $4,394.00 plus her costs incurred
herein."

In Finding No. 31, the Trial Court found "Plaintiff's

Counsel's fees were charged at the rate of $60.00 per hour, and
considering the length of time expended and the complexities of
the issues, the award of attorney's fees is reasonable."
Clearly, the award of attorney's fees was just and
proper, considering the testimony and evidence presented at trial
and by the Findings of the Trial Court, viewed as a whole.
This Court held that there was no admissible evidence
in the record to substantiate the reasonabless of the fees and,
as such, this matter was properly remanded to the Trial Court for
an evidentiary hearing on this single issue.
It is again pertinent to note, the Appellant has
failed to provide this Court with any authority to support his
position that the award of attorney's fees should be reversed.
Considering the ruling of the Trial Court on this issue, the
remand of this issue back to the Trial Court for an evidentiary
hearing on this issue was proper and a rehearing is not necessary.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT
THE APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL.
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The Appellant, in Section IV of his Petition for
Rehearing, is apparently requesting a new trial based upon
certain matters claimed to have come to light after the hearing
for modification and because the Trial Court erred since

the

Appellant was not allowed "a fundamental evidentiary hearing,"
(APR, page 6)
The broad discretionary power of the Trial Court in the
granting or denying of new trial is well established.

Page v.

Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 391 P2d 290 (Utah 1964); Haslam v.
Paulsen, 389 P2d 736 (Utah 1964).

Furthermore, a ruling on a

motion for a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal except when
there is a clear abuse of the Trial Court's discretion.

Jensen

v. Thomas, 570 P2d 574 (Utah 1962); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P2d 99
(Utah 1981).
With regard to the right to have a "fundamental
evidentiary hearing" the Appellant cites no authority to
substantiate that such a hearing was necessary.
Despite the lack of authority, it is pertinent to
review the procedural background of this matter.

The Appellant

filed a motion and memorandum for a new trial with supporting
affidavits with the Trial Court.

The Appellee then responded to

the Appellant's motion, memorandum and affidavits.
Rule 4-501 (8) of the Code of Judicial Administration
provides that motion may be decided by the Court without a
hearing.

Notwithstanding the above cited Rule, the Trial Court

granted the Appellant oral arguement on his motion.
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At the

conclusion of the oral arguments the Trial Court held that the
Appellant was not entitled to a new trial.
The Appellant was granted every opportunity afforded by
the applicable rules to pursuade the Trial Court that a new trial
should be granted.
persuaded.

This Court and Trial Court, however, were not

Accordingly, Appellant's request for rehearing on this

issue should be denied.
In addition, as this Court held, "For newly discovered
evidence to warrant a new trial, the evidence must have a
probative weight sufficient to have a probable effect on the
result.

(Cases cited.)

"The evidence Mr. Foxley proffers does

not have that degree of probative value, and the trial court thus
did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a new
trial."
V.
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
IS IMPROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
Appellant in his Petition for Rehearing is attempting
to raise an issue for the first time.

Appellant states "(He)

apologizes for characterizing his motions at trial and post trial
in his Brief as motion for directed verdict and judgment
nothwithstanding the verdict."

"In actuality, Mr. Foxley brought

a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment

..."

Since this issue was not properly raised by the
Appellant in his appeal it cannot now be brought before this
Court in a petition for rehearing.
Notwithstanding the above, Appellee asserts that it is
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ludicrous for the Appellant to claim that a summary judgment or
dismissal of the case should have been granted after the Appellee
concluded her presentation of evidence.

Without question there

were genuine issues of material fact raised which requried a
hearing on the merits.

As such, the Trial Court was justified in

dening the Appellant's motion, no matter how he now attempts to
characterize his motion.
CONCLUSION
Since the Appellant filed this appeal, he has filed
a second appeal with this Court concerning the enforcement of the
provisions of the modified decree of divorce (Case No. 900493),
he has filed a motion both in the Trial Court in this Court to
stay execution of the enforcement of the modified decree, which
motions were denied becasue the Appellant failed to comply with
the applicable rules of procedure, and the Appellee has filed two
motions with the Trial Court to attempt to have the Appellant
comply with the terms of the modified decree of divorce, for
example the Appellant has paid no alimony since the decree was
modified.
Appellee submits that the Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing is without merit and was filed in bad faith with the
sole purpose to avoid his obligations, to avoid compliance with
the provisions of the modified decree of divorce and to harass
the Appellee by exacting the greatest emotional and financial
trauma upon her which he is able.
The Appellant's Petition for Rehearing should be
dismissed and the opinion of this Court should be affirmed and
-13-

the Appellee should be granted sanctions, including double costs
and attorney fees, as provided by Rules 33 and 40 of the Rules of
the Utah Court of Appeals*
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